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PETER A. FLACH AND ANTONIS C. KAKAS
ON THE RELATION BETWEEN ABDUCTION AND
INDUCTIVE LEARNING
1 INTRODUCTION
This Handbook volume is devoted to abduction and learning as they appear in
various subﬁelds of artiﬁcial intelligence. Broadly speaking, abduction aims at
ﬁnding explanations for, or causes of, observed phenomena or facts. Learning oc-
curs when an agent adapts its state or behaviour on the basis of experience. Both
processes have a number of common characteristics. They both aim at improving
their picture or model of the universe of discourse; they are both hypothetical, in
the sense that the results may be wrong; and they can both be seen as reasoning
processes, with the observations and the current knowledge of the world as input
statements and the learned or abduced hypotheses as output statements.1 In the
case of learning from examples, which is the most common form of learning stud-
ied in artiﬁcial intelligence, this form of reasoning is called induction, and that is
the term we will be mostly using in this chapter.
Given these common characteristics of abduction and induction, it makes sense
to study them together. Once we have a clear picture of their similarities as well as
their differences, understanding one contributes to the understanding of the other.
Such an integrated study is the subject of this introductory chapter. As abduction
and induction have been studied in philosophy and logic as well as artiﬁcial in-
telligence, we review selected approaches from each of these disciplines before
attempting to come up with an integrated perspective.
Even a casual investigation of the literature on abduction and induction will
reveal that there is a signiﬁcant amount of controversy and debate. For instance,
Josephsonwritesthat‘itis possibletotreateverygood(...) inductivegeneralisation
as an instance of abduction’ [Josephson, 1994, p.19], while Michalski has it that
‘inductiveinferencewas deﬁned as a process of generatingdescriptions that imply
original facts in the context of background knowledge. Such a general deﬁnition
includesinductivegeneralisationandabductionasspecial cases’ [Michalski,1987,
p.188].
One can argue that such incompatible viewpoints indicate that abduction and
induction themselves are not well-deﬁned. Once their deﬁnitions have been ﬁxed,
studying their relation becomes a technical rather than a conceptual matter. How-
ever, it is not self-evident why there should exist absolute, Platonic ideals of ab-
duction and induction, waiting to be discovered and captured once and for all by
an appropriate deﬁnition. As with most theoretical notions, it is more a matter
1We exclude non-declarative learning systems such as neural networks, which learn without explicit
symbolic representations.2 PETER A. FLACH AND ANTONIS C. KAKAS
of pragmatics, of how useful a particular deﬁnition is going to be in a particular
context. Sometimes we want to stress that abduction and induction spring from
a common root (say hypothetical or non-deductive reasoning), and sometimes we
want to take a ﬁner grained perspective by looking at what distinguishes them
(e.g. the way in which the hypothesis extends our knowledge).
As alreadyremarked,the relationbetween abductionand inductionis subject of
an ongoing debate, and one of our aims in this introductory chapter is to chart the
terrain where the debate is taking place. We will retrace some of the main issues
in this debate to their historical background. We will also attempt a synthesis of
some of these issues, primarily motivated by work in artiﬁcial intelligence.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the philo-
sophical and logical origins of abduction and induction. In Section 3 we analyse
previous work on abduction and induction in the context of logic programming
and artiﬁcial intelligence, and attempt a (partial) synthesis of this work. Section 4
considers the integration of abduction and induction in artiﬁcial intelligence. In
Section 5 we brieﬂy survey the other chapters in this volume, indicating how they
perceive abduction and induction. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 ABDUCTION AND INDUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC
In this section we discuss various possible viewpoints on abduction and induction
thatcanbefoundinthephilosophicalandlogicalliterature.Thephilosophicalissue
is mainlyone ofcategorisation(whichformsofreasoningexist?), while thelogical
issue is one of formalisation.
As far as categorisation is concerned, it seems uncontroversial that deduction
should be singled out as a separate reasoning form which is fundamentally differ-
ent from any other form of reasoning by virtue of its truth-preserving nature. The
question, then, is how non-deductivereasoning should be mappedout. One school
of thought holds that no further sub-categorisation is needed: all non-deductive
logic is of the same category,which is called induction. Another school of thought
argues for a further division of non-deductivereasoning into abduction and induc-
tion. We will discuss these two viewpoints in the next two sections.
2.1 Induction as non-deductive reasoning
Let us start by taking a look at a textbook deﬁnition of induction.
Arguments can be classiﬁed in terms of whether their premisses pro-
vide (1) conclusive support, (2) partial support, or (3) only the ap-
pearance of support (that is, no real support at all.) When we say that
the premisses provideconclusivesupportfor the conclusion,we mean
that if the premisses of the argument were all true, it would be impos-
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have this characteristic are called deductive arguments. When we say
that the premisses of an argument provide partial support for the con-
clusion, we mean that if the premisses were true, they would give us
good reasons—but not conclusive reasons—to accept the conclusion.
That is to say, although the premisses, if true, provide some evidence
to support the conclusion, the conclusion may still be false. Argu-
ments of this type are called inductive arguments. [Salmon, 1984,
p.32]
This establishes a dichotomy of the set of non-fallacious arguments into either
deductive or inductive arguments, the distinction being based on the way they are
supported or justiﬁed: while deductive support is an absolute notion, inductive
support must be expressed in relative (e.g. quantitative) terms.
Salmonfurtherclassiﬁes inductiveargumentsinto argumentsbasedon samples,
arguments from analogy, and statistical syllogisms. Arguments based on samples
or inductive generalisations have the following general form:
percent of observed s are s;
therefore, (approximately) percent of all s are s.
Arguments from analogy look as follows:
Objects of type have properties , , , ...;
objects of type have properties , , , ..., and also property ;
therefore, objects of type have property as well.
Finally, statistical syllogisms have the following abstract form:
percent of all s are s;
is an ;
therefore, is a .
Here is understood to be a high percentage (i.e. if is close to zero, the con-
clusion must be changed to ‘ is not a ’).
There are several important things to note. One is that some premisses and con-
clusions are statistical, talking about relative frequencies (‘ percent of’), while
others are categorical. In general, we can obtain a categorical special case from
argumentsinvolvinga relative frequency by putting . Obviously,the
categorical variant of statistical syllogism is purely deductive. More importantly,
categorical inductive generalisation has the following form:
All observed s are s;
therefore, all s are s.
As argued in Section 2.3, most inductive arguments in artiﬁcial intelligence are
categorical, as this facilitates further reasoning with the inductive conclusion.4 PETER A. FLACH AND ANTONIS C. KAKAS
Regardless of whether inductive arguments are statistical or categorical, we
must have a way to assess their strengthor inductivesupport,and this is the second
way in which statistics comes into play. Given evidence collected in the pre-
misses of an inductive argument, we want to know the degree of belief we should
attach to the hypothetical conclusion . It is widely believed that degrees of be-
lief should be quantiﬁed as (subjective) probabilities – in particular, the degree of
belief in given is usually identiﬁed with the conditional probability .
The probabilistic formalisation of inductive support is known as conﬁrmation the-
ory.
It is tempting to consider the degree of conﬁrmation of hypothesis by evi-
dence as the degree of validity of the inductive argument ‘ , therefore ’, and
treat this ‘inductive validity’ as analogous to deductive validity. Following this
line of thought, several authors speak of conﬁrmation theory as establishing an
‘inductive logic’:
‘What we call inductive logic is often called the theory of nondemon-
strative or nondeductive inference. Since we use the term ‘inductive’
in the wide sense of ‘nondeductive’, we might call it the theory of
inductive inference... However, it should be noticed that the term ‘in-
ference’ must here, in inductive logic, not be understood in the same
sense as in deductive logic. Deductive and inductive logic are anal-
ogous in one respect: both investigate logical relations between sen-
tences; the ﬁrst studies the relation of [entailment], the second that of
degree of conﬁrmation which may be regarded as a numerical mea-
sure for a partial [entailment]... The term ‘inference’ in its customary
use implies a transition from given sentences to new sentences or an
acquisition of a new sentence on the basis of sentences already pos-
sessed. However, only deductive inference is inference in this sense.’
[Carnap, 1950, 44B, pp.205–6]
In other words, conﬁrmation theory by itself does not establish a consequence re-
lation (a subset of , where is the logical language), since any evidence will
conﬁrm any hypothesis to a certain degree. Inductive logic based on conﬁrmation
theory does not have a proof theory in the traditional sense, and therefore does
not guide us in generating possible inductive hypotheses from evidence, but rather
evaluates a given hypothesis against given evidence. The inductive logic arising
fromconﬁrmationtheoryis a logic of hypothesisevaluationrather than hypothesis
generation. This distinction between hypothesis generation and hypothesis eval-
uation is an important one in the present context, and we will have more to say
about the issue in Sections 2.3 and 3.
To summarise, one way to categorise arguments is by dividing them into non-
defeasible (i.e. deductive) and defeasible but supported (i.e. inductive) arguments.
A furthersub-categorisationcanbeobtainedbylookingat thesyntacticformofthe
argument. Conﬁrmation theory quantiﬁes inductive support in probabilistic terms,
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2.2 Deduction, induction and abduction
After having discussed the view that identiﬁes induction with all non-deductive
reasoning, we next turn to the trichotomy of deductive, inductive and abductive
reasoning proposed by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–
1914) .
Peirce was a very proliﬁc thinker and writer, but only a fraction of his work was
published during his life. His collected works [Peirce, 1958]2 therefore reﬂect,
ﬁrst and foremost, the evolution of his thinking, and should be approached with
some care. With respect to abduction and induction Peirce went through a sub-
stantial change of mind during the decade 1890 – 1900 [Fann, 1970]. It is perhaps
fair to say that manyof the currentcontroversiessurroundingabductionseem to be
attributable to Peirce’s mindchange. Below we will brieﬂy discuss both his early,
syllogistic theory, which can be seen as a precursor to the current use of abduction
in logic programmingand artiﬁcial intelligence, and his later, inferential theory, in
which abduction represents the hypothesis generation part of explanatory reason-
ing.
Peirce’s syllogistic theory
In Peirce’s days logic was not nearly as well-developed as it is today, and his ﬁrst
attempt to classify arguments (which he considers ‘the chief business of the logi-
cian’ (2.619), follows Aristotle in employing syllogisms. The following syllogism
is known as Barbara:
All the beans from this bag are white;
these beans are from this bag;
therefore, these beans are white.
The idea is that this valid argument represents a particular instantiation of a rea-
soning scheme, and that any alternative instantiation represents another argument
that is likewise valid. Syllogisms should thus be interpreted as argument schemas.
Two other syllogisms are obtained from Barbara if we exchange the conclusion
(or Result, as Peirce calls it) with either the major premiss (the Rule) or the minor
premiss (the Case):
Case. — These beans are from this bag.
Result. — These beans are white.
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Rule. — All the beans from this bag are white.
Result. — These beans are white.
Case. — These beans are from this bag.
2References to Peirce’s collected papers take the form , where denotes the volume number
and the paragraph within the volume.6 PETER A. FLACH AND ANTONIS C. KAKAS
The ﬁrst of these two syllogisms (inferenceofthe rule fromthe case andthe result)
can be recognised as what we called previously a categorical inductive generali-
sation, generalising from a sample of beans to the population of beans in the bag.
The sort of inference exempliﬁed by the second syllogism (inference of the case
fromtheruleandtheresult)Peircecalls makinga hypothesisor,brieﬂy,hypothesis
– the term ‘abduction’ is introduced only in his later theory.3
Peirce thus arrives at the following classiﬁcation of inference (2.623):
Inference
Deductive or Analytic
Synthetic
Induction
Hypothesis
Comparing this classiﬁcation with the one obtained in Section 2.1, we can point
out the following similarities. That what was called induction previously corre-
sponds to what Peirce calls synthetic inference (another term he uses is ampliative
reasoning, since it ampliﬁes, or goes beyond,the informationcontained in the pre-
misses). Furthermore, what Peirce calls induction corresponds to what we called
inductive generalisation in Section 2.1.4
On the other hand, the motivations for these classiﬁcations are quite different in
each case. In Section 2.1 we were concentrating on the different kinds of support
or conﬁrmation that arguments provide, and we noticed that this is essentially the
same for all non-deductive reasoning. When we concentrate instead on the syllo-
gisticformofarguments,weﬁndthistocorrespondmorenaturallytoa trichotomy,
separating non-deductive reasoning into two subcategories. As Horn clause logic
is in some sense a modern upgrade of syllogistic logic, it is perhaps not surprising
that thedistinctionbetweenabductionandinductionin logicprogrammingfollows
Peirce’s syllogistic classiﬁcation to a large extent. This will be further taken up in
Section 3.
Peirce’s inferential theory
In his later theory of reasoning Peirce abandoned the idea of a syllogistic classiﬁ-
cation of reasoning:
‘(...) I was too much taken up in considering syllogistic forms and
the doctrine of logical extension and comprehension, both of which I
made more fundamental than they really are. As long as I held that
opinion, my conceptions of Abduction necessarily confused two dif-
ferent kinds of reasoning.’ [Peirce, 1958, 2.102, written in 1902]
3Peirce also uses the term ‘retroduction’, a translation of the Greek word used by Aris-
totle (translated by others as ‘reduction’).
4It should be noted that, although the above syllogistic arguments are all categorical, Peirce also
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observations
predictions
hypothesis
abduction
deduction
induction
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Figure 1. The three stages of scientiﬁc inquiry.
Instead, he identiﬁed the three reasoning forms – abduction, deduction and induc-
tion – with the three stages of scientiﬁc inquiry: hypothesisgeneration, prediction,
and evaluation (Figure 1). The underlying model of scientiﬁc inquiry runs as fol-
lows. When confronted with a number of observations she seeks to explain, the
scientist comes up with an initial hypothesis; then she investigates what other con-
sequences this theory,were it true, would have; and ﬁnally she evaluates the extent
to which these predicted consequences agree with reality. Peirce calls the ﬁrst
stage, coming up with a hypothesis to explain the initial observations, abduction;
predictions are derived from a suggested hypothesis by deduction; and the credi-
bility of that hypothesis is estimated through its predictions by induction. We will
now take a closer look at these stages.
Abductionis deﬁnedbyPeirce as the processof forminganexplanatoryhypoth-
esis from an observation requiring explanation. This process is not algorithmic:
‘the abductive suggestion comes to us like a ﬂash. It is an act of insight, although
of extremely fallible insight’ [Peirce, 1958, 5.181]. Elsewhere Peirce describes
abduction as ‘a capacity for ‘guessing’ right’, a ‘mysterious guessing power’ un-
derlying all scientiﬁc research [Peirce, 1958, 6.530]. Its non-algorithmiccharacter
notwithstanding, abduction
‘is logical inference (...) having a perfectly deﬁnite logical form. (...)
Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a hypothesis, un-
less it be supposed that it would account forthe facts or some of them.
The form of inference, therefore, is this:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,8 PETER A. FLACH AND ANTONIS C. KAKAS
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.’ [Peirce, 1958, 5.188–
9]
Let us investigate the logical form of abduction given by Peirce a little closer.
About C we know two things: that it is true in the actual world, and that it is
surprising. The latter thing can be modelled in many ways, one of the simplest
being the requirement that C does not follow from our other knowledge about the
world.
Then,‘if A weretrue, C wouldbea matterofcourse’is usuallyinterpretedas ‘A
logicallyentails C’.5 Peircecalls A anexplanationofC, oran‘explanatoryhypoth-
esis’. Whether or not this is an appropriate notion of explanation remains an issue
of debate. See [Console and Saitta, 2000] for argumentssupportingexplanationas
entailment, and [Josephson, 2000] for counterarguments.
Besides being explanatory, Peirce mentions two more conditions to be fulﬁlled
by abductive hypotheses: they should be capable of experimental veriﬁcation,
and they should be ‘economic’. A hypothesis should be experimentally veriﬁ-
able, since otherwise it cannot be evaluated inductively. Economic factors include
the cost of verifying the hypothesis, its intrinsic value, and its effect upon other
projects [Peirce, 1958, 7.220]. In other words, economic factors are taken into ac-
count when choosing the best explanation among the logically possible ones. For
this reason, abduction is often termed ‘inference to the best explanation’ [Lipton,
1991].
Induction is identiﬁed by Peirce as the process of testing a hypothesis against
reality through selected predictions. ‘Induction consists in starting from a theory,
deducing from it predictions of phenomena, and observing those phenomena in
order to see how nearly they agree with the theory’ [Peirce, 1958, 5.170]. Such
predictions can be seen as experiments:
‘When I say that by inductive reasoning I mean a course of exper-
imental investigation, I do not understand experiment in the narrow
sense of an operation by which one varies the conditions of a phe-
nomenon almost as one pleases. (...) An experiment (...) is a question
put to nature. (...) The question is, Will this be the result? If Na-
ture replies ‘No!’ the experimenter has gained an important piece of
knowledge. If Nature says ‘Yes,’ the experimenter’s ideas remain just
as they were, only somewhat more deeply engrained.’ [Peirce, 1958,
5.168]
This view of hypothesis testing is essentially what is called the ‘hypothetico-
deductive method’ in philosophy of science [Hempel, 1966]. The idea that a ver-
iﬁed prediction provides further support for the hypothesis is very similar to the
notion of conﬁrmation as discussed in Section 2.1, and also refutation of hypothe-
ses through falsiﬁed predictions can be brought in line with conﬁrmation theory,
5Note that interpreting the second premiss as a material implication, as is sometimes done in the
literature, renders it superﬂuous, since the truth of A C follows from the truth of the observation C.ON THE RELATION BETWEEN ABDUCTION AND INDUCTIVE LEARNING 9
with a limiting degree of support of zero.6 The main difference from conﬁrmation
theory is that in the Peircean view of induction the hypothesis is, through the pre-
dictions, tested against selected pieces of evidence only. This leads to a restricted
form of hypothesis evaluation, for which we will use the term hypothesis testing.
Peirce’s inferential theory makes two main points. It posits a separation be-
tween hypothesis generation and hypothesis evaluation; and it focuses attention
on hypotheses that can explain and predict. Combining the two points, abduc-
tion is the process of generating explanatory hypotheses (be they general ‘rules’
or speciﬁc ‘cases’, as in the syllogistic account), and induction corresponds to the
hypothetico-deductive method of hypothesis testing. However, the two points are
relatively independent: e.g., we can perceive generation of non-explanatory hy-
potheses. We will come back to this point in the discussion below.
2.3 Discussion
In the previous two sections we have considered three philosophical and logical
perspectives on how non-deductive reasoning may be categorised: the inductivist
view, which holds that no further categorisation is needed since all non-deductive
reasoning must be justiﬁed in the same way by means of conﬁrmation theory; the
syllogistic view, which distinguishes between inductive generalisation on the one
hand and hypothesis or abduction as inference of speciﬁc ‘cases’ on the other;
and the inferential view, which holds that abduction and induction represent the
hypothesisgenerationandevaluationphasesinexplanatoryreasoning. Aswethink
that none of these viewpoints provides a complete picture, there is opportunity to
come to a partial synthesis.
Hypothesis generation and hypothesis evaluation
The most salient point of Peirce’s later, inferential theory is the distinction be-
tween hypothesis generation and hypothesis evaluation. In most other accounts of
non-deductive reasoning the actual hypothesis is already present in the argument
under consideration, as can be seen clearly from the argument forms discussed in
Section 2.1. For instance, when constructing an inductive generalisation
percent of observed s are s;
therefore, (approximately) percent of all s are s.
our job is ﬁrst to conjecture possible instantiations of and (hypothesis gen-
eration), and then to see whether the resulting argument has sufﬁcient support
(hypothesis evaluation).
One may argue that a too rigid distinction between generationand evaluation of
hypothesesis counter-productive,since it wouldleadto the generationofmany,ul-
timately useless hypotheses. Indeed, Peirce’s ‘economic factors’, to be considered
6From a Bayesian perspective is proportional to , where is the prior
probability of the hypothesis; if is contrary to a prediction .10 PETER A. FLACH AND ANTONIS C. KAKAS
when constructing possible abductive hypotheses, already blur the distinction to a
certain extent. However, even if a too categorical distinction may have practical
disadvantages, on the conceptual level the dangers of confusing the two processes
are much larger. Furthermore, the distinction will arguably be sharper drawn in
artiﬁcial reasoning systems than it is in humans, just as chess playing computers
still have no real alternative to ﬁnding useful moves than to consider all possible
ones.
In any case, whether tightly integrated or clearly separated, hypothesis genera-
tion and hypothesis evaluation have quite distinct characteristics. Here we would
argue that it is hypothesis generation, being concerned with possibilities rather
than choices, that is most inherently ‘logical’ in the traditional sense. Deductive
logicdoes nothelp themathematicianin selecting theorems,onlyin distinguishing
potential theorems from fallacious ones. Also, as [Hanson, 1958] notes, if hypoth-
esis evaluationestablishes a logic at all, thenthis wouldbe a ‘Logicof theFinished
Research Report’ rather than a ‘Logic of Discovery’. An axiomatic formalisation
of the logic of hypothesis generation is suggested by Flach in his chapter in this
volume.
We also stress the distinction between generationand evaluation because it pro-
vides a useful heuristic for understanding the various positions of participants in
thedebateonabductionandinduction. This ruleofthumbstates thatthose concen-
trating on generating hypotheses tend to distinguish between non-deductiveforms
of reasoning; those concentratingon evaluatinghypotheses tend not to distinguish
between them.
Inductive generalisation
Turning next to the question ‘What is induction?’, we expect that any form of
consensus will centre around the argument form we called inductive generalisa-
tion (see above). In the inductivist approachsuch sample-to-populationarguments
were separated out on syntactic grounds. They also ﬁgured in Peirce’s syllogistic
theory as one of the two possible reversals of Barbara.
As we remarked above, hypothesis generation here amounts to instantiating
and . In general the number of possibilities is large, but it can be reduced by
constraining the proportion . Many artiﬁcial intelligence approaches to induc-
tion actually choose and such that is (close to) 100%, thereby effectively
switching to categorical inductive generalisations:
All observed s are s;
therefore, all s are s.
For instance, instead of observing that 53% of observed humans are female, such
approacheswill continueto reﬁne until all observed s are female (for instance,
could be ‘humans wearing a dress’).
Thepointhereis notso muchthatin artiﬁcial intelligencewe areonlyinterested
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data, exceptions to rules, etc. Instead of representing these uncertainties explic-
itly in the form of relative frequencies, one deals with them semantically, e.g. by
attaching a degree of conﬁrmation to the inductive conclusion, or by interpreting
rules as defaults.
The above formulation of categorical inductive generalisation is still somewhat
limiting. The essential step in any inductive generalisation is the extension of
the universal quantiﬁer’s scope from the sample to the population. Although the
universally quantiﬁed sentence is frequently a material implication, this need not
be. A more general form for categorical inductive generalisation would therefore
be:
All objects in the sample satisfy ;
therefore, all objects in the population satisfy .
where denotes a formula with free variable . Possible instantiations of
can be found by pretending that there exist no other objects than those in the
sample, and looking for true universal sentences. For instance, we might note that
every object in the sample is either female or male.
Conﬁrmatory and explanatory induction
This more comprehensive formulation of categorical inductive generalisation also
indicates a shortcoming of Peirce’s inferential theory: not all hypotheses are ex-
planatory. For instance,take the inductivegeneralisation‘everyobject in thepopu-
lationis femaleor male’. This generalisationdoesnot, byitself, explainthat Maria
is female, since it requires the additional knowledge that Maria is not male. Like-
wise, an explanationof Johnbeingmale is onlyobtainedbyaddingthat John is not
female. This phenomenon is not restricted to disjunctive generalisations: the rule
‘every parent of John is a parent of John’s brother’ does not explain parenthood.
Inlinewithrecentdevelopmentsininductivelogicprogramming,wewouldlike
to suggest that inductive generalisations like these are not explanatory at all. They
simply are generalisations that are conﬁrmed by the sample. The process of ﬁnd-
ing such generalisations has been called conﬁrmatory induction (also descriptive
induction). The difference between the two forms of induction can be understood
as follows. A typical form of explanatory induction is concept learning, where we
want to learn a deﬁnition of a given concept in terms of other concepts. This
means that our inductive hypotheses are required to explain (logically entail) why
particular individuals are s, in terms of the properties they have.
However, in the more general case of conﬁrmatory induction we are not given
a ﬁxed concept to be learned. The aim is to learn relationships between any of
the concepts, with no particular concept singled out. The formalisation of con-
ﬁrmatory hypothesis formation thus cannot be based on logical entailment, as in
Peirce’sabduction. Rather, it is a qualitativeformofdegreeofconﬁrmation,which
explains its name. We will have more to say about the issue in Section 3.2.12 PETER A. FLACH AND ANTONIS C. KAKAS
Abduction
Turning next to abduction, it may seem at ﬁrst that Peirce’s syllogistic and infer-
ential deﬁnitions are not easily reconcilable. However, it is possible to perceive a
similarity between the two when we notice that the early syllogistic view of ab-
duction or hypothesis (p. 5) provides a special form of explanation. The Result
(taking the role of the observation)is explainedby the Case in the light of the Rule
as a given theory. The syllogistic form of abduction can thus be seen to meet the
explanatory requirement of the later inferential view of abduction. Hence we can
consider explanation as a characterising feature of abduction. This will be further
discussed in Section 3.2.
Even if the syllogistic and inferential view of abduction can thus be reconciled,
it is still possible to distinguishbetween approacheswhich are primarilymotivated
byoneofthetwoviews. Thesyllogisticaccountofabductionhasbeentakenup,by
andlarge,in logicprogrammingandotherworkin artiﬁcialintelligenceaddressing
tasks such as that of diagnosis and planning.
3 ABDUCTION AND INDUCTION IN LOGIC PROGRAMMING AND
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
In this section, we will examinehow abductionand inductionappear in the ﬁeld of
artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) and its speciﬁc subﬁeld of logic programming. In Sec-
tion3.1wewill arguethatintheseﬁeldsabductionandinductionaregenerallyper-
ceived as distinct reasoning forms, mainly because they are used to solve different
tasks. Consequently, most of what follows should interpreted from the viewpoint
of Peirce’s earlier, syllogistic theory. In Section 3.2 we argue that abductive hy-
potheses primarily provide explanations, while inductive hypotheses provide gen-
eralisations. We then further investigate abduction and induction from a logical
perspective in Section 3.3, pointing out differences in the way in which they ex-
tend incompletetheories. In Section 3.4 we investigatehow more complexreason-
ing patterns can be viewed as being built up from simple abductive and inductive
inferences. Finally, in Section 3.5 we address the computational characteristics of
abduction and induction.
3.1 A task-oriented view
In AI the two different terms of abduction and induction exist separately and are
used by different communities of researchers. This gives the impression that two
distinct and irreducible forms of non-deductive reasoning exist. We believe this
separation to be caused by the fact that in AI, irrespective of the level at which we
areexaminingthe problem,we areeventuallyinterestedin tacklingparticulartasks
such as planning, diagnosis, learning, and language understanding. For instance,
a prototypical AI application of abductive reasoning is the problem of diagnosis.
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system,fortheobserved(oftenfaulty)behaviourofthesystem. Atypicalinductive
task, on the other hand, is the problem of concept learning from examples. From a
collection of observations which are judged according to some background infor-
mation to be similar or related we draw hypotheses that generalise this observed
behaviour to other as yet unseen cases.
Whatdistinguishesthis AIviewfromthephilosophicalandlogicalanalysesdis-
cussed in the previous section is the more practical perspective required to tackle
these tasks. Hence in AI it is necessary to study not only the issue of hypothesis
evaluation but also the problem of hypothesis generation, taking into account the
speciﬁc characteristics of each different task. These tasks require different effects
fromthenon-deductivereasoningusedto addressthem,resultingindifferentkinds
of hypotheses, generated by different computational methods. As we will argue in
Section 3.2, abductive hypotheses are primarily intended to provide explanations
and inductive hypotheses aim at providing generalisations of the observations.
The point we want to stress here is that in AI hypothesis generation is a real
issue, while in philosophy and logic it often seems to be side-stepped since the
analysis usually assumes a given hypothesis. Since abduction and induction pro-
duce different kinds of hypotheses, with different relations to the observations and
the backgroundtheory, it seems natural that this increased emphasis on hypothesis
generationreinforcesthedistinguishingcharacteristicsof the two reasoningforms.
However,despite this emphasis on hypothesis generation in AI it is not possible to
avoid the problem of hypothesisevaluation and selection amongst several possible
alternatives. Returning to this problem we see that work in AI where the empha-
sis lies on hypotheses selection tends to conclude that the two forms of reasoning
are not that different after all – they use the same kind of mechanism to arrive at
the conclusion. This is seen in Poole’s work which uses Bayesian probability for
the selection of hypotheses and Josephson’s work where several, more qualitative
criteria are used.
Peirce revisited
AI’s emphasis on solving practical tasks notwithstanding, most research is still
aimedatprovidinggeneralsolutionsintheformofabductiveandinductiveengines
that can be applied to speciﬁc problems by providing the right domain knowledge
and setting the right parameters. In order to understand what these systems are
doing, it is still necessary to use abstract (logical) speciﬁcations. Let us examine
this more closely, using the case of logic programming and its two extensions of
abductive and inductive logic programming.
Logic programming assumes a normal form of logical formulae, and therefore
has a strong syllogistic ﬂavour. Consequently, the logic programming perception
of abduction and induction essentially follows Peirce’s earlier, syllogistic charac-
terisation. Here are Peirce’s two reversals of the syllogism Barbara, recast in logic
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Case.—
Result.—
Rule.—
Rule.—
Result —
Case —
The ﬁrst pattern, inference of a general rule from a case (description) and a re-
sult (observation) of a particular individual, exempliﬁes the kind of reasoning per-
formed by inductive logic programming (ILP) systems. The second pattern, in-
ferring a more complete description of an individual from an observation and a
general theory valid for all such individuals, is the kind of reasoning studied in
abductive logic programming (ALP).
The above account describes ILP and ALP by example, and does not provide
a general deﬁnition. Interestingly, attempts to provide such a general deﬁnition
of abduction and induction in logic programming typically correspond to Peirce’s
later, inferential characterisation of explanatory hypotheses generation. Thus, in
ALP abductive inference is typically speciﬁed as follows:
‘Given a set of sentences (a theory presentation), and a sentence
(observation), to a ﬁrst approximation, the abductive task can be
characterisedastheproblemofﬁndingasetofsentences (abductive
explanation for ) such that:
(1) ,
(2) is consistent. ’ [Kakas et al., 1992, p.720]
The following is a speciﬁcation of induction in ILP:
‘Given a consistent set of examples or observations and consistent
backgroundknowledge ﬁndanhypothesis suchthat:
’ [Muggleton and De Raedt, 1994]
In spite of small terminological differences the two speciﬁcations are virtually
identical: they both invert a deductive consequence relation in order to complete
an incomplete given theory, prompted by some new observations that cannot be
deductivelyaccountedforbythetheoryalone.7 Ifourassessment ofthe distinction
between abduction and induction that is usually drawn in AI is correct, we must
conclude that the above speciﬁcations are unable to account for this distinction.
In the remainder of Section 3 we will try to understand the differences between
abduction and induction as used in AI in modern, non-syllogistic terms. For an
account which stays closer to syllogisms, the reader is referred to [Wang, 2000].
7Extra elements that are often added to the above deﬁnitions are the satisfaction of integrity con-
straints for the case of abduction, and the avoidance of negative examples for the case of induction;
these can again be viewed under the same heading, namely as being aimed at exclusion of certain
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3.2 Explanation and generalisation
Let us further analyse the logical processes of abduction and induction from the
utility perspective of AI, and examine to what extent it is possible to distinguish
two such processes on the basis of the function they are intended to perform. We
will arguethat sucha distinctionis indeedpossible, since thefunctionof abduction
is to provide explanations, and the function of induction is to provide generalisa-
tions. Some of our views on this matter have been inﬂuenced directly by the paper
by Console and Saitta [2000] where more discussion on this possibility of distinc-
tion between abduction and induction can be found.
First, it will be convenient to introduce some further terminology.
Observables and abducibles
We will assume a common ﬁrst-order language for all knowledge (known, ob-
served, or hypothetical). We assume that the predicates of this language are sep-
arated into observables and non-observables or background predicates. Domain
knowledgeorbackgroundknowledgeisageneraltheoryconcerningnon-observable
predicates only. Foreground knowledge is a general theory relating observable
predicates to background predicates and each other. Instance knowledge (some-
times called scenario knowledge) consists of formulae containing non-observable
predicatesonly,possiblydrawnfroma restrictedsubset ofsuch predicates. Known
instance knowledge can be part of the background knowledge. Observations are
formulae containing observable predicates, known to hold; predictions are similar
to observations, but their truthvalue is not given.
It will often be useful to employ the notion of an individual to refer to a partic-
ular object or situation in the domain of discourse. For example, instance knowl-
edge will usually contain descriptions of individuals in terms of non-observable
predicates (thence the name). An unobserved or new individual is one of which
the description becomes known only after the abductive or inductive hypothesis
has been formed. As a consequence, the hypothesis cannot refer to this particular
individual; however, the hypothesis may still be able to provide a prediction for it
when its description becomes available.
Given this terminology, we can specify the aim of induction as inference of
foreground knowledge from observations and other known information. Typically,
this information consists of background and instance knowledge, although other
known foreground knowledge may also be used. In some cases it may be empty,
for instance when we are learning the deﬁnition of a recursive predicate, when we
are learning the deﬁnitions of several mutually dependent predicates, or when we
are doing data mining. The observations specify incomplete (usually extensional)
knowledge about the observables, which we try to generalise into new foreground
knowledge.
On the other hand, in abduction we are inferring instance knowledge from
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ground information pertaining to the observations at hand. Possible abductive hy-
potheses are built from speciﬁc non-observable predicates called abducibles in
ALP. The intuition is that these are the predicates of which the extensions are not
completely known as instance knowledge. Thus, an abductive hypothesis is one
which completes the instance knowledge about an observed individual.
Explanation
Non-deductive reasoning as used in AI provides two basic functions that are gen-
erally useful in addressing different problems. These two functions are (a) ﬁnding
how a piece of information came about to be true according to a general theory
describing the domain of interest, and (b) constructing theories that can describe
the present and future behaviour of a system. Purely from this utility point of
view, non-deductive reasoning is required to provide these two basic effects of
explanation and generalisation. Informally, for the purposes of this chapter it is
sufﬁcient for explanation to mean that the hypothesis reasoned to (or generated)
by the non-deductive reasoning does not refer to observables (i.e. consists of in-
stance knowledge) and entails a certain formula (an observation), and for gener-
alisation to mean that the hypothesis can entail additional observable information
on unobserved individuals (i.e. predictions).
As we have seen before, both abduction and induction can be seen as a form of
reverseddeductionin the presenceof a backgroundtheory,and thus formallyqual-
ifyas providingexplanationsof somesort. Theclaim that abductionis explanatory
inference indeed seems undisputed, and we do not ﬁnd a need to say more about
the issue here. We only point out that if an abductive explanation is required
to consist of instance knowledge only, then clearly abduction needs a given theory
of foreground knowledge, connecting observables to background predicates, in
order to be able to account for the observation with . An abductive explanation
thus makes sense only relative to this theory from which it was generated: it
explains the observation according to this particular theory.
However, if induction provides explanations at all, these explanations are of a
different kind. For instance, we can say that ‘all the beans from this bag are white’
is an explanation for why the observed beans from the bag are white. Notice how-
ever that this kind of explanationis universal: ‘observed s are ’ is explainedby
the hypothesis that ‘all s are ’. This explanation does not depend on a particu-
lar theory: it is not according to a particular model of the ‘world of beans’. It is a
general, meta-level explanationthat does not provideany insight to why things are
so. As Josephson puts it, inductive hypotheses do not explain particular observa-
tions, but they explain the frequencies with which the observations occur (viz. that
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Generalisation
We thus ﬁnd that inductive hypotheses are not explanatory in the same way as
abductive hypotheses are. But we would argue that being explanatory is not the
primary aim of inductive hypotheses in the ﬁrst place. Rather, the main goal of in-
ductionis to providegeneralisations. In this respect, we ﬁndthat the ILP deﬁnition
of induction (p. 14) is too much focused on the problem of learning classiﬁcation
rules, without stressing the aspect of generalisation. An explanatory hypothesis
would only be inductive if it generalises. The essential aspect of induction as ap-
plied in AI seems to be the kind of sample-to-population inference exempliﬁed
by categorical inductive generalisation, reproduced here in its more general form
from Section 2.3:
All objects in the sample satisfy ;
therefore, all objects in the population satisfy .
As with Peirce’s syllogisms, the problem here is that is already assumed to
be given, while in AI a major problem is to generate such hypotheses. The speciﬁ-
cation of conﬁrmatory or descriptive induction follows this pattern, but leaves the
hypothesis unspeciﬁed:
Given a consistent set of observations and a consistent background
knowledge , ﬁnd a hypothesis such that:
[Helft, 1989; De Raedt and Bruynooghe, 1993; Flach, 1995]
Hence the formal requirement now is that any generated hypothesis should be true
ina certainmodelconstructedfromthegivenknowledgeandobservations(e.g.the
truth-minimal model).
This speciﬁcation can be seen as sample-to-populationinference. For example,
in Peirce’s bean example (p. 5), is ‘these beans are from this bag’ (instance
knowledge), is ‘these beans are white’ (observation), and – ‘all the beans
from this bag are white’ – is satisﬁed by the model containing ‘these beans’ as the
only beans in the universe. Under the assumption that the population is similar to
the sample, we achieve generalisation by restricting attention to formulae true in
the sample. Note that the induced hypothesis is not restricted to one explaining
the whiteness of these beans: we might equally well have induced that ‘all white
beans are from this bag’.
Abovewedeﬁneda hypothesisas generalisingifit makesapredictioninvolving
an observable. We have to qualify this statement somewhat, as the following ex-
ample shows (taken from [Console and Saitta, 2000]). Let our background theory
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The observation is . A possible explanation for this observa-
tion is . While this explanation is clearly completing instance
knowledge and thus abductive, adding it to our theory will lead to the prediction
. Thus, the hypothesis that John has measles also seems to qual-
ify as a generalisation. We would argue however that this generalisation effect
is already present in the background theory. On the other hand, an inductive hy-
pothesis produces a genuinely new generalisation effect, in the sense that we can
ﬁnd new individuals for which the addition of the hypothesis to our knowledge is
necessary to derive some observable property for these individuals (usually this
property is that of the observations on which the induction was based). With an
abductive hypothesis this kind of extension of the observable property to other
new individuals does not necessarily require the a priori addition of the abduc-
tive hypothesis to the theory but depends only on the properties of this individual
and the given background theory: the generalisation, if any, already exists in the
background theory.
We conclude that abductive and inductive hypotheses differ in the degree of
generalisationthateachof themproduces. With thegivenbackgroundtheory we
implicitly restrict the generalising power of abduction as we require that the basic
model of our domain remains that of . The existence of this theory separates two
levelsofgeneralisation: (a)thatcontainedinthetheoryand(b)newgeneralisations
that are not given by the theory. In abduction we can only have the ﬁrst level with
no interest in genuinely new generalisations, while in induction we do produce
such new generalisations.
3.3 Extending incomplete theories
We will now further examine the general logical process that each of abduction
and induction takes. The overall process that sets the two forms of reasoning of
abduction and induction in context is that of theory formation and theory devel-
opment. In this we start with a theory (that may be empty) which describes at
a certain level the problem domain we are interested in. This theory is incom-
plete in its representation of the problem domain, as otherwise there is no need for
non-deductive ampliative reasoning. New information given to us by the observa-
tions is to be used to complete this description. As we argue below, abduction and
induction each deal with a different kind of incompleteness of the theory .
Abductive extensions
In a typical use of abduction, the description of the problem domain by the the-
ory is further assumed to be sufﬁcient, in the sense that it has reached a stage
where we can reason with it. Typically this means that the incompleteness of the
theory can be isolated in some of its non-observable predicates, which are called
abducible (or open) predicates. We can then view the theory as a representation
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abducible hypothesis . An enumeration of all such formulae (consistent with )
gives the set of all possible abductive extensions of . Abductive entailment with
is then deﬁned by deductive entailment in each of its abductive extensions.
Alternatively, we can view each abductive formula as supplying the missing
instance knowledge for a different possible situation or individual in our domain,
whichis thencompletelydescribedby . Forexample,an unobservedindivid-
ual and its backgroundpropertiescan be understoodvia a correspondingabductive
formula . Once we have these background properties, we can derive – using
– other properties for this new individual.8 Given an abductive theory as above,
the process of abduction is to select one of the abductive extensions of in
which the given observation to be explained holds, by selecting the corresponding
formula . We can then reason deductively in to arrive at other conclu-
sions. By selecting we are essentially enabling one of the possible associations
between and the observation among those supplied by the theory .
It is important here to emphasise that the restriction of the hypothesis of abduc-
tion to abducible predicates is not incidental or computational, but has a deeper
representational reason. It reﬂects the relative comprehensiveness of knowledge
of the problem domain contained in . The abducible predicates and the allowed
abductiveformulae take the role of ‘answer-holders’for the problem goals that we
want to set to our theory. In this respect they take the place of the logical variable
as the answer-holder when deductive reasoning is used for problem solving. As a
result this means that the form of the abductive hypothesis depends heavily on the
particular theory at hand, and the way that we have chosen to represent in this
our problem domain.
Typically, the allowed abducible formulae are further restricted to simple log-
ical forms such as ground or existentially quantiﬁed conjunctions of abducible
literals. Although these further restrictions may be partly motivated by compu-
tational considerations, it is again important to point out that they are only made
possible by the relative comprehensiveness of the particular representation of our
problem domain in the theory . Thus, the case of simple abduction – where the
abducible hypothesis are ground facts – occurs exactly because the representation
of the problem domain in is sufﬁciently complete to allow this. Furthermore,
this restriction is not signiﬁcant for the purposes of comparison of abduction and
induction: our analysis here is independent of the particular form of abducible
formulae. The important elements are the existence of an enumeration of the ab-
ductive formulae, and the fact that these do not involve observable predicates.
Inductive extensions
Let us now turn to the case of induction and analyse this process to facilitate com-
parison with the process of abduction as described above. Again, we have a col-
lection of possible inductive hypotheses from which one must be selected. The
8Note that this type of abductive (or open) reasoning with a theory collapses to deduction, when
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main difference now is the fact that these hypotheses are not limited to a particu-
lar subset of predicates that are incompletely speciﬁed in the representation of our
problem domain by the theory , but are restricted only by the language of . In
practice, there may be a restriction on the form of the hypothesis, called language
bias, but this is usually motivated either by computational considerations, or by
other information external to the theory that guides us to an inductive solution.
Another essential characteristic of the process of induction concerns the role of
the selected inductivehypothesis . The role of is to extend the existing theory
to a new theory , rather than reason with under the set of assump-
tions as is the case for abduction. Hence is replaced by to become a new
theory with which we can subsequently reason, either deductively of abductively,
to extract information from it. The hypothesis changes by requiring extra
conditions on the observable predicates that drive the induction, unlike abduction
where the extra conditions do not involve the observable predicates. In effect,
provides the link between observables and non-observables that was missing or
incomplete in the original theory .
Analogously to the concept of abductive extension, we can deﬁne inductive
extensions as follows. Consider a common given theory with which we are
able to perform abduction and induction. That is, has a number of abductive
extensions . Choosing an inductive hypothesis as a new part of the theory
has the effect of further conditioning each of the abductive extensions .
Hence, while in abduction we select an abductive extension of , with induction
we extend each of the abductive extensions with . The effect of induction is thus
‘universal’ on all the abductive extensions.
If we now consider the new abductive theory , constructed by
induction,we can viewinductionas a processofselecting a collectionofabductive
extensions, namely those of the new theory . Hence an inductive extension can
be viewed as a set of abductive extensions of the original theory that are further
(uniformly) conditioned by the common statement of the inductive hypothesis .
This idea of an inductive extension consisting of a set of abductive extensions was
usedin[Deneckeretal.,1996]toobtainaformalisationofabductionandinduction
as selection processes in a space of possible world models over the given theory in
each case. In this way the process of induction can be seen to have a more general
form than abduction, able to select a set of extensions rather than a single one.
Note that this does not necessarily mean that induction will yield a more general
syntactic form of hypotheses than abduction.
Analysis
Comparing the possible inductive and abductive extensions of a given theory
we have an essential difference. In the case of abduction some of the predicates in
the theory, namely the observables, cannot be arbitrarily deﬁned in an extension.
The freedom of choice of abduction is restricted to constrain directly (via ) only
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through the theory: the observables must be grounded in the existing theory
by the choice of the abductive conditions on the abducible part of the extension.
Hence in an abductive extension the extent to which the observables can become
true is limited by the theory and the particular conditions on the rest of the
predicates.
In induction this restriction is lifted, and indeed we can have inductive exten-
sions of the given theory , the truthvalue of which on the observable predicates
need not be attributed via to a choice on the abducibles. The inductive exten-
sions ‘induce’ a more general change (from the point of view of the observables)
on the existing theory , and – as we will see below – this will allow induction to
genuinely generalise the given observations to other cases not derivable from the
original theory . The generalising effect of abduction, if at all present, is much
more limited. The selected abductive hypothesis may produce in further
information on abducible or other predicates, as in the measles example from the
previous section. Assuming that abducibles and observables are disjoint, any in-
formation on an observable derived in is a generalisation already contained
in .
What cannot happen is that the chosen abductive hypothesis alone (with-
out ) predicts a new observation, as does not affect directly the value of the
observable predicates. Every prediction on an observable derived in , not
previously true in (including the observation that drives the abductive process),
corresponds to some further instance knowledge , which is a consequence of
, and describes the new situation (or individual) at hand. Such consequences
are already known to be possible in the theory , as we know that one of its
possible extensions is . In the measles example (p. 17), the observation
gives rise to the hypothesis = . Adopt-
ing this hypothesis leads to a new prediction , corresponding to
the instance knowledge = , which is a consequence of .
This new prediction could be obtained directly from without
the need of = .
Similarly, if we consider a previously unobserved situation (not derivable from
) described by with deriving a new observation, this is
alsoalreadyknowntobepossibleas is oneofthepossibleextensions
of . For example, if = , then , and in fact
derives ,which is againnot a genuinegeneralisation.
Inshort, abductionis meantto select somefurtherconditions underwhichwe
shouldreason with . It concernsonly this particularsituation describedby and
hence,if cannotimposedirectlyanyconditionsonthe observablepredicates,the
only generalisations that we can get on the observables are those contained in
under the particular restrictions . In this sense we say that the generalisation is
not genuine but already contained in . Hence, abduction increases the intension
of known individuals (abducible properties are now made true for these individu-
als), but does not have a genuine generalisation effect on the observables (it does
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uals for which the theory alone couldnot producethis extensionwhen it is given
the instance knowledge that describes these individuals).
On the other hand, the universal conditioning of the theory by the inductive
hypothesis produces a genuine generalisation on the observables of induction.
The extra conditions in on the observables introduce new information on the
relation of these predicates to non-observablepredicates in the theory , and from
this we get new observable consequences. We can now ﬁnd cases where from
alone together with a (non-observable) part of , describing this case, we can
derive a prediction not previously derivable in .
The new generalisation effect of induction shows up more when we consider
as above the case where the given theory for induction has some of its predicates
as abducible (different from the observables). It is now possible to have a new
individual described by the extra abducible information , such that in the
new theory produced by induction a new observation holds which
was not known to be possible in the old theory (i.e. it is not a consequence of
). Note that we cannot (as in the case of abduction) combine with
to a set of instance knowledge, under which the observation would
hold from the old theory . We can also have that a new observation holds alone
from the hypothesis and for such previously unobserved situations not
described in the given theory . These are cases of genuine generalisation not
previously known to be possible from the initial theory .
Summarising this subsection, induction – seen as a selection of a set of ex-
tensions deﬁned by the new theory – has a stronger and genuinely new
generalising effect on the observable predicates than abduction. The purpose of
abduction is to select an extension and reason with it, thus enabling the general-
ising potential of the given theory . In induction the purpose is to extend the
given theory to a new theory, the abductive extensions of which can provide new
possible observable consequences.
Finally, we point out a duality between abduction and induction (ﬁrst studied
in [Dimopoulos and Kakas, 1996]) as a result of this analysis. In abduction the
theory is ﬁxed and we vary the instance knowledge to capture (via ) the ob-
servable knowledge. On the other hand, in induction the instance knowledge is
ﬁxed as part of the background knowledge , and we vary the general theory so
that if the selected theory is taken as our abductive theory then the instance
knowledgein will form an abductivesolutionfor the observationsthat drovethe
induction. Conversely,if we performabductionwith andwe considerthe abduc-
tive hypothesis explaining the observations as instance knowledge, the original
theory forms a valid inductive hypothesis.
3.4 Interaction between abduction and induction
In the preceding sections we analysed basic patterns of abduction and induction.
In practice hybrid forms of ampliative reasoning occur, requiring an interaction
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Let us consider a simple example originating from [Michalski, 1993]. We have
the observation that:
: all bananas in this shop are yellow,
and we want to explain this given a theory containing the statement:
: all bananas from Barbados are yellow.
An explanation for this is given by the hypothesis:
: all bananas in this shop are from Barbados.
Is this a form of abduction or a form of induction, or perhaps a hybrid form? As
we will show, this strongly depends on the choice of observables and abducibles.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that we choose ‘yellow’ as observable and the other predicates
as abducibles.9 The hypothesis selects amongst all the possible abductive ex-
tensions of the theory (corresponding to the different abducible statements of
instance knowledge consistent with ) a particular one. In this selected extension
the observation is entailed and therefore the hypothesis explains according to the
abductive theory the observation. Note that this hypothesis does not gener-
alise the given observations: it does not enlarge the extension of the observable
predicate ‘yellow’ over that provided by the statement of the observation . In
fact, we can replace the universal quantiﬁcation in ‘all bananas from this shop’ by
a typical representative through skolemisation. More importantly, the link of the
observation with the extra informationof is known a priori as one of the pos-
sible ways of reasoning with the theory to derive new observable information.
There is a second way in which to view this reasoning and the hypothesis
above. We can consider the predicate ‘from Barbados’ as the observable predicate
with a set of observations that each of the observed bananas in the shop is from
Barbados. We then have a prototypical inductive problem (like the white bean ex-
ample of Peirce) where we generate the same statement as above, but now as
an inductive hypothesis. From this point of view the hypothesis now has a gen-
uine generalising effect over the observations on the predicate ‘from Barbados’.
But where did the observations on Barbados come from? These can be obtained
from the theory as separate abductive explanations for each of the original ob-
servations(or a typicalone) on the predicate‘yellow’. We can thus understandthis
exampleas a hybridprocessofﬁrst using(simple)abductionto translateseparately
each givenobservationas an observationon the abducibles, and then use induction
to generalise the latter set of observations, thus arriving at a general statement on
the abducibles.
Essentially, in this latter view we are identifying, by changing within the same
problem the observable and abducible predicates, simple basic forms of abduction
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and induction on which we can build more complex forms of non-deductive rea-
soning. Referringbackto ourearlierdiscussion inSection 3, thesebasic formsare:
pureabductionforexplanationwith nogeneralisationeffect (overwhat alreadyex-
ists in the theory ); and pure induction of simple generalisations from sample to
population. This identiﬁcation of basic distinct forms of reasoning has important
computational consequences. It means that we can consider two basic computa-
tional modelsfor the separate tasks of abductionand induction. The emphasisthen
shifts to the question of how these basic forms of reasoning and computation can
be integrated together to solve more complex problems by suitably breaking down
these problems into simpler ones.
It is interesting to note here that in the recent framework of inverse entailment
as usedbytheILP system Progol[Muggleton,1995]wherewecan learnfromgen-
eral clauses as observations, an analysis of its computationas done in [Yamamoto,
2000] reveals that this can be understood as a mixture of abduction and induction.
As described in the above example, the Progol computation can be separated into
ﬁrst abductively explainingaccording to the backgroundtheory a skolemised, typ-
ical observation,and theninductivelygeneralisingoverthis abductiveexplanation.
The usefulness of explicitly separating out abduction and induction is also evident
in several works of theoryformationor revision. Basic computationalforms of ab-
duction and induction are used together to address these complex problems. This
will be describedfurtherin Section 4 on the integrationof abductionand induction
in AI.
3.5 Computational characteristics
We will close this section by discussing further the computational distinction that
the basic forms of abduction and induction have in their practice in AI and logic
programming. Indeed, when we examine the computational models used for ab-
ductionandinductioninAI,we noticethat theyare verydifferent. Theirdifference
is so wide that it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to use the computationalframework
of one form of reasoningin orderto computethe otherform of reasoning. Systems
developedinAIforabductioncannotbeusedforinduction(andlearning),andvice
versa, inductive AI systems cannot be used to solve abductive problems.10
We will describe here the main characteristics of the computational models of
the basic forms of abduction and induction, discussed above, as they are found in
practical AI approaches. According to these basic forms, abduction extracts an
explanation for an observation from a given theory , and induction generalises a
set of atomic observations. For abduction the computation has the following basic
form: extract from the given theory a hypothesis and check this for consis-
tency. The search for a hypothesis is done via some form of enhanced deduction
method e.g. resolution with residues [Cox and Pietrzykowski, 1986; Eshghi and
10With the possible exception of Cigol[Muggleton and Buntine, 1988], a system designed for doing
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Kowalski, 1989; Kakas and Mancarella, 1990; Denecker and de Schreye, 1992;
Inoue, 1992; Kakas and Michael, 1995], or unfolding of the theory [Console et
al., 1991; Fung and Kowalski, 1997].
The importantthing to note is that the abductivecomputationis primarilybased
on the computation of deductive consequences from the theory . The proofs are
now generalised so that they can be successfully terminated ‘early’ with an abduc-
tiveformula. Tocheckconsistencyofthe foundhypothesis,abductivesystems em-
ploystandarddeductivemethods(thesemaysometimesbespeciallysimpliﬁedand
adapted to the particular form that the abductive formulae are restricted to take).
If a hypothesis (or part of a hypothesis) is found inconsistent then it is rejected
and another one is sought. Note that systems that compute constructive abduction
(e.g. SLDNFA [Denecker and de Schreye, 1998], IFF [Fung and Kowalski, 1997],
ACLP [Kakas and Michael, 1995]), where the hypothesis may not be ground but
can be an existentially quantiﬁed conjunction(with arithmetic constraints on these
variables) or even a universally quantiﬁed formula, have the same computational
characteristics. They arrive at these more complex hypotheses by extending the
proof methods for entailment to account for the (isolated) incompleteness on the
abducible predicates.
On the other hand, the computational model for the basic form of induction in
AI takes a rather different form. It constructs a hypothesis and then reﬁnes this
under consistency and other criteria. The construction of the hypothesis is based
on methods for inverting entailment proofs (or satisfaction proofs in the case of
conﬁrmatory induction) so that we can obtain a new theory that would then entail
(or be satisﬁed by) the observations. Thus, unlike the abductive case, the compu-
tation cannot be based on proof methods for entailment, and new methods such as
inverse resolution, clause generalisation and specialisation are used. In induction
the hypothesis is generated from the language of the problem domain (rather than
a given theory of the domain), in a process of iteratively improving a hypothesis
to meet the various requirements posed by the problem. Furthermore, in induc-
tion the comparison of the different possible hypotheses plays a prominent and
dynamic role in the actual process of hypothesis generation, whereas in abduction
evaluationofthe differentalternativehypothesismaybedoneafterthese havebeen
generated.
It should be noted, however, that the observed computational differences be-
tween generating abductive hypotheses and generating inductive hypotheses are
likely to become smaller once more complex abductive hypotheses are allowed.
Much of the computational effort of ILP systems is spent on efﬁciently searching
and pruning the space of possible hypotheses, while ALP systems typically enu-
merate all possible abductive explanations. The latter approach becomes clearly
infeasible when the abductive hypothesis space grows. In this respect, we again
mention the system Cigol which seems to be the only system employing a uniﬁed
computational method (inverse resolution) to generate both abductive and induc-
tive hypotheses.
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we consider the different works of trying to integrate abduction and induction in
a common system. In most of these works, each of the two forms of reasoning
is computed separately, and their results are transferred to the other form of rea-
soning as input. The integration clearly recognises two different computational
processes (for each reasoning) which are then suitably linked together. For exam-
ple, in LAB [Thompson and Mooney, 1994] or ACL [Kakas and Riguzzi, 1997;
Kakas and Riguzzi, 1999]the overall computationis that of inductionas described
above, but where now – at the point of evaluation and improvementof the hypoth-
esis – a speciﬁc abductive problem is computed that provides feedback regarding
the suitability of the inductive hypothesis. In other cases, such as RUTH [Ad´ e et
al., 1994] or Either [Ourston and Mooney, 1994] an abductive process generates
new observable input for a subsidiary inductive process. In all these cases we have
well-deﬁned separate problems of simple forms of abduction and induction each
of which is computed along the lines described above. In other words, the compu-
tational viability of the integrated systems depends signiﬁcantly on this separation
of the problem and computation into instances of the simple forms of abduction
and induction.
4 INTEGRATION OF ABDUCTION AND INDUCTION
The complementarity between abduction and induction, as we have seen it in the
previous section – abduction providing explanations from the theory while induc-
tion generalises to form new parts of the theory – suggests a basis for their integra-
tion. Cooperation between the two forms of reasoning would be useful within the
contextof theorydevelopment(constructionor revision),where a currenttheory
is updatedto a new theory in the light of new observations so that captures
(i.e. ).
At thesimplest level, abductionandinductionsimplyco-existandbothfunction
as revision mechanisms that can be used in developing the new theory [Michalski,
1993]. In a slightly more cooperative setting, induction provides new foreground
knowledge in for later use by abduction. At a deeper level of cooperation, ab-
ductionandinductioncan be integratedtogetherwithin the process of constructing
. There are several ways in which this can happen within a cycle of development
of , as will be described below.
The cycle of abductive and inductive knowledge development
On the one hand, abduction can be used to extract from the given theory and
observations abducible information that would then feed into induction as (ad-
ditional) training data. One example of this is provided by [Ourston and Mooney,
1994], where abduction identiﬁes points of repair of the original, faulty theory ,
i.e. clauses that could be generalised so that positive observations in become
entailed, or clauses that may need to be specialised or retracted because they areON THE RELATION BETWEEN ABDUCTION AND INDUCTIVE LEARNING 27
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Figure 2. The cycle of abductive and inductive knowledge development.
inconsistent with negative observations.
A more active cooperation occurs when, ﬁrst, through the use of basic abduc-
tion, the original observations are transformed to data on abducible background
predicates in , becoming training data for induction on these predicates. An ex-
ample of this was discussed in Section 3.4; another example in [Dimopoulos and
Kakas, 1996] shows that only if, before inductive generalisation takes place, we
abductivelytransform the observationsinto other predicates in a uniform way, it is
possible to solve the original inductive learning task.
In the framework of the system RUTH [Ad´ e et al., 1994], we see induction
feeding into the original abductive task. An abductive explanation may lead to a
set of required facts on ‘inducible’ predicates, which are inductively generalised
to give a general rule in the abductive explanation for the original observations,
similar to (one analysis of) the bananas example discussed previously.
These types of integrationcan be succinctly summarised as follows. Consider a
cycleof knowledgedevelopmentgovernedby the ‘equation’ , where
is the current theory, the observation triggering theory development, and the
new knowledge generated. Then, as shown in Figure 2, on one side of this cycle
we have induction, its output feeding into the theory for later use by abduction,
as shown in the other half of the cycle, where the abductive output in turn feeds
into the observational data for later use by induction, and so on.
Inducing abductive theories
Another way in which induction can feed into abduction is through the generation
of conﬁrmatory (or descriptive) inductive hypotheses that could act as integrity
constraints for the new theory. Here we initially have some abductive hypothe-
ses regarding the presence or absence of abducible assumptions. Based on these
hypotheses and other data in we generate, by means of conﬁrmatory induction,
new sentences which, when interpretedas integrityconstraints on the new theory
, would support the abducible assumptions (assumptions of presence would be
consistent with , assumptions of absence would now be inconsistent with ).
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on a deeper level of integration of the two forms of reasoning, where induction is
perceived as hypothesising abductive (rather than deductive) theories. The deduc-
tive coverage relation for learning is replaced by abductive coverage, such that an
inductive hypothesis is a valid generalisation if the observations can be abduc-
tively explained by , rather than deductively entailed. A simple exam-
ple of this is the extension of Explanation-BasedLearning with abduction [Cohen,
1992; O’Rorke, 1994], such that deductive explanations are allowed to be com-
pleted by abductive assumptions before they are generalised.
Inducing abductive theories is particularly useful in cases where the domain
theoryisincomplete,andalsowhenperformingmultiplepredicatelearning,asalso
in this case the background knowledge for one predicate includes the incomplete
data for the other predicates to be learned. In these cases the given theory is
essentially an abductive theory, and hence it is appropriate to use an abductive
coverage relation. On the other hand, it may be that the domain that we are trying
to learn is itself inherently abductive or non-monotonic (e.g. containing nested
hierarchies of exceptions), in which case the hypothesis space for learning is a
space of abductive theories.
LAB [Thompson and Mooney, 1994] is one of the ﬁrst learning systems adopt-
ing this point of view The class predicates to be learned are the abducible predi-
cates, and the induced theory describes the effects of these predicates on other
predicates that we can observe directly with rules of the form observation
class. Then the training examples (each consisting of a set of properties and
its classiﬁcation) are captured by the induced hypothesis when the correct
classiﬁcation of the examples forms a valid abductive explanation, given , for
their observed properties. Other frameworks for learning abductive theories are
given in [Kakas and Riguzzi, 1997; Kakas and Riguzzi, 1999; Dimopoulos et al.,
1997] and [Lamma et al., 2000]. Here, both explanatory and conﬁrmatory induc-
tion are used to generate theories together with integrity constraints. Inoue and
Haneda [2000] also study the problem of learning abductive logic programs for
capturing non-monotonictheories.
With this type of integration we can perceive abduction as being used to eval-
uate the suitability or credibility of the inductive hypothesis. Similarly, abductive
explanations that lead to induction can be evaluated by testing the induced gen-
eralisation. In this sense, the integration of abduction and induction can help to
cross-evaluate the hypothesis that they generate.
5 ABDUCTION AND INDUCTION IN THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS
VOLUME
We now brieﬂy survey the other eight chapters in this volume with regard to their
approach to abduction and induction.
A ﬁrst distinction can be made regarding the nature of the representation and
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chapters by Paul, Gabbay, Flach, and Bergadano et al., and mainly probabilistic
(or possibilistic) in the last four chapters by Dubois & Prade, Borgelt & Kruse, de
Campos et al., and Gebhardt. Of these, the last three employ graphical models to
represent probabilistic assumptions regarding the domain.
A second distinction is that half of the chapters are concerned with abduction:
PaulandGabbayinthelogicalapproach,andDubois&PradeandBorgelt&Kruse
in the probabilistic or possibilistic approach. Similarly, there are two ‘logical’
chapters dealing (mainly) with inductive learning, viz. Flach and Bergadano et al.,
and two ‘probabilistic’ chapters, namely de Campos et al. and Gebhardt.
Both Gabriele Paul and Dov Gabbay, in their respective chapters, adopt the ex-
planatory view of abduction, in which abduction is the process of extending an
incomplete theory with one or more abducibles such that given observations are
entailed or explained. This corresponds most closely to Peirce’s later, inferential
theory, in which abduction plays the role of generating possible explanations for
given observations, although there are similarities also with the syllogistic theory,
in particular where they discuss the logic programmingperspective. Both chapters
tendto concentrateon generatingpossible abductivehypothesesrather thanselect-
ingthe best one, althoughPaul describes a selection criterionbasedon a coherence
metric.
The next two ‘logical’ chapters, by Flach, and Bergadano, Cutello & Gunetti,
are written by authors with a machine learning background. Flach aims at logi-
cally characterising various forms of inductive learning, concentrating on the hy-
pothesis generation part. With regard to explanatory induction, this (confusingly)
corresponds to what Peirce called abduction in his inferential theory; the differ-
ence is that Flach is primarily interested in general hypotheses. Bergadano et al.,
on the other hand, take the syllogistic perspective found in logic programmingand
distinguish between abduction and induction by means of the syntactic form of
the hypotheses (speciﬁc facts in the case of abduction, general rules in the case of
induction). A particular interest of their chapter is that it addresses ways of inte-
gratingabductionandinductivelearning(seealsoSection4ofthepresentchapter).
Next follow four ‘probabilistic’ chapters. Didier Dubois and Henri Prade con-
sider causal diagnosticproblemsolving, i.e. inferences of the form: from“if disor-
der is present then symptom is observed” and “symptom is observed”infer “disor-
der is plausible”. The main concern of their chapter is to assign degrees of plausi-
bilities to possible disorders; thus, it concentrates on hypothesis evaluation rather
than hypothesis generation. Evaluating abductive hypotheses is also the concern
of the next chapter by Christian Borgelt and Rudolf Kruse, who propose proba-
bilistic networks as a possible approach. A special interest of their chapter is that
it considers possible connections between logical and probabilistic approaches to
abduction.
The last two chaptersstudy the problemof learningprobabilisticor possibilistic
graphical models. The chapter by de Campos, Huete & Moral concentrates on
the underlying notion of stochastic independence, which allows decomposition
of probability distributions and other uncertainty measures. Gebhardt investigates30 PETER A. FLACH AND ANTONIS C. KAKAS
one suchalternativeto probabilitytheory,namely possibilitytheory. Both chapters
address the problem of ﬁnding a graphical model that best ﬁts the data, which can
be seen as an inductive learning problem.
6 CONCLUSIONS
The nature of abduction and induction is still hotly debated. In this introductory
chapter we have tried to chart the terrain of possible positions in this debate. From
a logico-philosophical perspective, there are broadly speaking two positions: ei-
ther one holds that abduction provides explanations and induction provides gener-
alisations; or one can hold that abduction is the logic of hypothesis generation and
induction is the logic of hypothesis evaluation. AI approaches tend to adopt the
ﬁrst perspective (although there are exceptions) – abduction and induction each
deal with a different kind of incompleteness of the given theory, extending it in
different ways.
Abduction and induction can be usefully integrated when trying to solve com-
plex theory development tasks. We have reviewed a number of AI approaches to
such integration. Most of these frameworks of integration use relatively simple
forms of abduction and induction, namely abduction of ground facts and basic in-
ductive generalisations. Moreover, each of the two is computed separately and
its results transferred to the other, thus clearly recognising two separate and basic
computational problems. From these, they synthesise an integrated form of rea-
soning that can produce more complex solutions, following a cyclic pattern with
each form of reasoning feeding into the other.
An important open question in artiﬁcial intelligence is the integration of logical
and numericaluncertaintyhandlingformalisms, and this is no less true in the areas
of abduction and inductive learning. While such an integration has not been the
focus of this introductorychapter, various other chapters in this volume do address
it to some extent. We hope that the volume will be found useful as an attempt
to further our understanding of abduction and learning, and contributes towards a
fuller understanding of uncertainty handling in AI.
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